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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 960203-CA 
v. : 
Priority No. 15 
ANGELO GIRON, : 
Defendant-Appellee. 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff State of Utah appeals a final order of dismissal, entered by the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable William B. Bohling, 
presiding, in a prosecution for unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine). 
Dismissal was ordered following the trial court's order suppressing evidence, which order 
rendered the prosecution unable to proceed. See State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 
1993). This State's appeal is taken pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 
1995), as construed in Troyer. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, 
ISSUE PRESERVATION, 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the search of Giron's 
automobile, made upon Giron's arrest but after he was handcuffed and seated in a police 
cruiser, was not justified as a search incident to arrest? 
2. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that officers who arrested Giron 
could not impound his automobile due to the proximity of Giron's automobile to his 
residence at the time of the arrest and impoundment? 
3. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the "inventory search" of 
Giron's automobile was an improper "pretext" search? 
Each issue was preserved by the Supplement to State's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress (R. 64-67), and by the trial court's rulings 
on the merits (R. 95) (see also Point I-A of this brief). A "bifurcated" review standard 
applies for each issue: Underlying fact findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed 
only for "clear error." The court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256,1265-71 (Utah 1993). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This case involves the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
which states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Angelo Giron was charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony (R. 8). The physical evidence 
supporting the charge includes cocaine powder and drug paraphernalia (syringes and 
spoons) (R. 8-9). Giron moved to suppress that evidence, contending that police had 
seized it during an illegal search of his automobile (R. 45-46, 53-61). After an 
evidentiary hearing, review of the parties' memoranda, and argument, the trial court 
entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, granting the motion to 
suppress (R. 92-96). 
Owing to the State's inability to proceed without the suppressed evidence, 
the case was dismissed with prejudice (R. 109-10,112-13). The State appealed, filed its 
docketing statement, and moved for summary reversal, arguing that the trial court had 
erroneously rejected the State's contention that the search of Giron's automobile was 
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proper incident to his arrest (Sum. Reversal Motion, No. 960203-CA, filed 4/10/96). 
After review of Giron's memorandum in opposition, this Court denied the summary 
reversal motion, reserving all issues for plenary review (Order filed 5/28/96). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Original Stop 
On 22 January 1995, Officers Bench and Ruth were motor patrolling the 
West side of Salt Lake City (Tr. 9/18/95 at 4-5). Officer Bench saw an automobile make 
an improper U-tum, and therefore signalled the automobile to stop; it promptly did so (id. 
at 5, 30). Bench approached defendant Giron, who was the driver, and asked for his 
driver's license; instead, Giron produced a Utah identification card (id. at 6). Meanwhile, 
Giron's passenger exited from the automobile and started to walk away, discarding what 
appeared to be narcotics (id. at 6-7). Officer Ruth attempted to apprehend the passenger, 
who ran away (id. at 7). Bench directed Giron to wait while he assisted Officer Ruth 
(id.). Instead of waiting, Giron drove off, squealing his tires as he departed (id. at 8). 
It took some time for the officers to complete the arrest and booking of 
Giron's passenger. They then attempted to locate Giron. From his identification card, the 
officers conducted a record check which revealed that Giron's driver's license was 
suspended or expired; they also learned his address (id. at 8-9). Approximately three 
hours after the original stop, the officers went to Giron's address. They did not find 
anybody at the residence (id. at 9,37). 
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The Second Stop, Arrest, & Search 
Shortly after leaving Giron's residence, the officers saw him driving the 
same automobile as before, but accompanied by a different passenger. They again 
signalled Giron to stop, using lights and siren (id. at 10, 33). This time, Giron did not 
promptly stop; instead, he drove on for roughly a city block, making two turns before 
finally stopping across the street from his residence (id. at 10, 33-34, 36). 
Officer Bench arrested Giron for failing to obey his order to remain at the 
scene of the original stop (id. at 10-11, 34). He handcuffed Giron and placed him in the 
police cruiser (id. at 11, 34-35). The officers impounded Giron's automobile, which was 
properly registered to Giron (id. at 35). They began an inventory search of the 
automobile, recovering suspected illegal substances (tested and found to be cocaine) and 
paraphernalia including scales, syringes, spoons, and baggies (id. at 12-14,41). Another 
officer was summoned to complete the inventory and to await the tow truck, while 
Officers Bench and Ruth drove Giron to jail (id. at 14-15, 37-38). 
The Suppression Motion 
In the trial court, Giron moved to suppress the contraband, arguing that the 
officers had no authority to impound his automobile, and that the inventory search "was a 
mere pretext for an investigatory search" (Mem. in Support of Mot. to Suppress, R. 53-61 
(copied in appendix I of this brief)). In its initial memorandum in opposition, the State 
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argued that the impoundment and inventory search were valid (this memorandum never 
was placed in the trial court record, but was acknowledged by Giron's counsel (R. 208)). 
An evidentiary hearing was held on the motion (R. 121-79). The State 
introduced copies of the written Salt Lake Police impound/inventory policy and the 
written inventory of Giron's automobile to document compliance with the policy (R. 162-
63, 168-69 (admission of State's exhs. 1 & 2, copied in appendix II)). Under direct and 
cross examination, Officer Bench explained that under the Salt Lake policy, the decision 
whether to impound an arrestee's car is discretionary with the arresting officer (R. 156-
66). The policy does not require officers to seek alternatives to impoundment (R. 163). 
In this case, Officer Bench explained, he impounded Giron's automobile due to "Driver 
arrest, no driver license, nobody to turn the vehicle over to" (R. 132). 
Officer Bench stated that to his best-admittedly poor-recollection, Giron's 
passenger (at the second stop) had not been asked to take custody of Giron's automobile 
because the passenger did not have a driver's license with him (R. 155-56). Officer 
Bench also explained that he and Officer Ruth did not re-check Giron's residence to see if 
anybody there could take the vehicle, because they had just been at the residence and had 
found nobody home (R. 156-57). Nor was Giron's mother (who apparently lived with 
Giron) asked to care for the automobile. She had appeared at the arrest scene, but not 
until after the contraband had already been recovered (R. 160). 
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Besides arguing that Giron's automobile was validly impounded and 
inventoried, the State argued that the search of Giron's vehicle was proper incident to his 
lawful arrest. The State had not raised this argument in its original memorandum in 
opposition to suppression. However, in a supplemental memorandum filed after the 
evidentiary hearing, but before argument on the motion about six weeks later, the State 
argued, in the alternative, that Giron's automobile had been properly searched incident to 
his arrest (Supp. to State's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress, R. 66-67 
(filed 10/23/95) (copied in appendix I)). 
The State pursued the "search incident to arrest" theory at oral argument on 
the motion to suppress (R. 193-96). Through counsel, Giron argued that the evidence did 
not support that theory (R. 207-09).] In particular, Giron noted that at the time of the 
-^Giron's counsel alluded to waiver, but did not assert it against the State: 
At the time the [police] report's filed it's clear that he is 
characterizing it as an inventory. Indeed the state filed a memorandum in 
this case early on. As soon as I filed a motion to suppress, they filed a 
memorandum, no mention whatsoever of search incident to arrest. 
We do a hearing and at the hearing no one argues, no one asks 
questions in regards to search incident to arrest. Now, we don't have 
pleading rules like civil lawyers do, but we do have burdens of proof and 
it's clear in this case that it is the burden of the state to provide some 
exception to the per se unreasonableness of a warrantless search. They 
presented no testimony whatsoever, and for the very first time was when 
the state filed their responsive memorandum they indicated that because-
inventory obviously wouldn't work—that they were now going to rely on 
search incident to arrest. I don't think there's any way they can establish 
that, particularly given the fact that no evidence was adduced in that 
regard. 
(R. 207-08). 
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search, he was handcuffed and seated in the police cruiser, with no realistic prospect of 
reaching into his own automobile (R. 209-12). 
The trial court granted the motion to suppress, rejecting both the "inventory 
search" and the "search incident to arrest" arguments advanced by the State (R. 216-17). 
The parties each proffered findings of fact and conclusions of law; at one point the State 
moved, unsuccessfully, for reconsideration of the trial court's ruling (R. 71-89). In its 
final, Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court ruled as follows: 
1. That as a result [of] the Defendant's vehicle being parked 
directly across [the street] from his residence, impoundment was 
neither authorized nor necessary. 
2. Even assuming arguendo the impound was justified, the 
"inventory" search was merely a pretext for an investigatory search 
for evidence. 
3. That at the time of the search the Defendant had been 
secured and removed from the area, that there was no physical or 
temporal proximity to the arrest, and no basis to justify the search of 
Defendant's vehicle as a search incident to his arrest. 
(R. 95, copied in appendix III). Because the suppression order made it impossible for the 
prosecution to proceed, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, as provided in 
State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993) (R. 109, 112). The State itfw appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erroneously ruled that Giron's automobile could not be 
lawfully searched incident to his arrest. Giron was handcuffed and seated in the police 
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cruiser when the search was conducted; however, these facts do not support the trial 
court's ruling. To the contrary, settled law-most particularly the United States Supreme 
Court's Belton decision and this Court's Moreno decision-permits a search incident to 
arrest even under these facts. The trial court erred by disregarding this law. 
2. The trial court also erred in concluding that Giron's automobile could 
not validly be impounded because it was parked across the street from his home when he 
was arrested. Fourth Amendment law, stated in the United States Supreme Court's 
Bertine decision, imposes no such limitation on police prerogative to impound a vehicle. 
Instead, impoundment is justified so long as it is supported by some reason other than a 
criminal investigation. In this case, such reason existed because Giron's had no driver's 
license, and the police impoundment policy permits impoundment to prevent law 
violations. Impoundment of Giron's automobile helped to assure that he would not 
continue to unlawfully without a license, and was therefore proper. 
3. Finally, the trial court erroneously condemned the post-impoundment 
inventory search of Giron's automobile as "pretextual." "Pretext" analysis has been 
eliminated from the analysis of both temporary detentions and full arrests of persons, 
under the Utah Supreme Court's Lopez and Harmon decisions. It is therefore 
incongruous and inappropriate to apply "pretext" analysis to the search of an impounded 
automobile, because such search does not invade liberty to nearly the same extent as an 
arrest. The trial court also committed clear error by finding that the inventory search was 
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not conducted in conformity with the applicable police policy. The unrebutted evidence 
showed that a written policy existed, and was followed in this case. Therefore, the 
inventory search of Giron's automobile was valid. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT GIRON'S AUTOMOBILE COULD NOT BE 
SEARCHED INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST 
The most immediate and appropriate basis for reversal of the trial court's 
judgment lies in its conclusion that Giron's automobile could not, without a warrant, be 
searched incident to his arrest (R. 95). True, Giron had been handcuffed and placed in the 
police cruiser at the time of the search; therefore, as a literal matter, he could not reach 
into his automobile to grab a weapon or destroy evidence. However, these facts do not 
support the trial court's conclusion that the search of Giron's automobile was not justified 
as a "search incident to arrest"—a settled exception to the warrant requirement. 
A. This Issue is Preserved for Appellate Review. 
Opposing the State's summary reversal motion on this point, Giron argued 
that the State waived its "search incident to arrest" argument by failing to present it in 
timely fashion to the trial court (Mem. in Opp. to Sum. Reversal, No. 960203-CA at 2 
n.l, 9). The argument is not waived. Although raised for the first time in its 
supplemental memorandum filed after the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, 
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the State's "incident to arrest" argument was properly presented to the trial court. The 
trial court granted specific leave for both parties to file memoranda at the conclusion of 
the evidentiary hearing on 18 September 1995 (R. 177-78). Hence Giron's memorandum 
supporting suppression was filed on 13 October (R. 53), and the State's supplemental 
memorandum in opposition, presenting the "incident to arrest" argument, was filed on 23 
October (R. 62, copied in appendix I). 
Argument on the motion was held on 30 October 1995 (R. 180-220). 
Rather than arguing that the State had waived the "incident to arrest" argument, Giron 
argued that the facts did not support it-that is, he opposed the argument on the merits (R. 
208-12; see also pp. 7-8 n.2 of this brief). Finally, the trial court's rejection of the 
"incident to arrest" argument was not based upon waiver, but rested exclusively on the 
merits: "[A]t the time of the search the Defendant had been secured and removed from 
the area, [so that] that there was no physical or temporal proximity to the arrest..." (R. 
95). Thus besides being timely raised, the trial court's ruling on the merits preserved the 
"search incident to arrest" issue for appellate review. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 
1150,1161 (Utah 1991) (when trial court addresses merits of issue raised for first time in 
new trial motion, prior waiver is excused). 
B. Under Settled Law, the Search was Proper Incident to Arrest 
On the merits, the search of Giron's automobile was proper incident to his 
arrest. The law on this point is settled and straightforward, and has been consistently 
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applied in Utah. Accordingly, there is no "measure of deference," State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935-40 (Utah 1994), to be granted to the trial court's judgment. 
The pertinent, uncontested facts are as follows: Officer Bench arrested 
Giron for failing to obey his order to remain at the scene of the original stop. He assisted 
Giron out of his automobile, handcuffed Giron, and placed him in the police cruiser (R. 
130-31,154-55). Officer Bench then searched the interior of Giron's automobile, 
recovering contraband from the passenger area (under and between the driver and front 
passenger seats, and on the back seat) (R. 132-34,159). 
A key fact finding underpinning the trial court's rejection of the State's 
"search incident to arrest" argument reads: "At the time Officer Bench searched Mr. 
Giron's car, any possibility of Mr. Giron gaining access to the car for purposes of 
recovering a weapon, or concealing or destroying evidence had been completely 
eliminated by the arrest, handcuffing, and the removal of the Defendant from the area of 
the vehicle" (R. 94). Although correct, that finding, as a matter of law, does not support 
the conclusion that the search was improper. Under settled Fourth Amendment law, a 
search of the passenger area of an arrestee's automobile is proper, even after police have 
rendered the arrestee unable to actually reach into the automobile. See New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454,461 (1981) (reversing suppression order; search incident to arrest 
was proper even though arrestees were moved away from the vehicle); State v. Kent, 665 
P.2d 1317,1381 (Utah 1983) (search was proper even though arrestee was handcuffed 
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and lying on ground next to vehicle); State in re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044,1046 (Utah 1981) 
(per curiam) (search proper even though arrestee removed from vehicle). See also Chimel 
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) (both discussing extent of permissible search 
incident to arrest). 
This conclusion is reinforced by this Court's decision in State v. Moreno, 
910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). In Moreno, this 
Court upheld a warrantless search of the defendant's automobile, conducted after the 
defendant's arrest and after the defendant had been handcuffed and placed into a patrol 
car. 910 P.2d at 1246. That is, the Court upheld a search conducted under circumstances 
that were virtually identical to the pertinent facts of this case. 
In upholding the Moreno search, this Court reviewed the above-cited 
"search incident to arrest" cases, cases from other states and the federal courts of appeals, 
and the preeminent treatise on Fourth Amendment law, Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure (3rd ed. 1996). Quoting Professor LaFave's analysis of Belton, the leading case, 
this Court observed: "[U]nder Belton a search of the vehicle is allowed even after the 
defendant was removed from it, handcuffed, and placed in the squad car, or even if a 
single defendant was in custody of several officers." Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1248 (quoting 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c) at 448-49). Accordingly, this Court held that the 
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search of defendant Moreno's vehicle 'Svas clearly proper as a search incident to a lawful 
arrest." Id. at 1247 (emphasis added). 
Because the search in Moreno was "clearly proper," the search in this case 
also was clearly proper. As explained in Moreno and its underpinning authority, it does 
not matter that the arrestee is unable to reach into his automobile when the search is 
conducted. The scope of a permissible search incident to arrest is not so tightly confined; 
instead, such search may include "the interior of a recently occupied automobile." 
Moreno, 910 P.2d at 2864 (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 460). And the search in Moreno 
was proper under settled law that the State cited in this case, particularly Belton (R. 67), 
opposing Giron's motion to suppress.2 
The trial court's ruling in this case is also out of line with State v. Anderson, 
910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), and with State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992). 
Anderson involved the arrest of a suspected drug trafficker, stopped by police on the open 
highway. The defendant and his passenger were ordered to lie down outside their 
automobile, and handcuffed; officers then searched their automobile. 910 P.2d at 1231. 
The supreme court upheld that search, finding that probable cause and "exigent 
circumstances" justified it. Id. at 1237. Strickling involved a search under an 
automobile's seat following a valid stop, the arrival of backup officers, and removal of 
2The State provided a copy of Moreno, then just issued, to the trial court with a "Request 
for Disposition" filed after the court entered its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (R. 99-107). 
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the automobile's occupants. 844 P.2d at 982. This Court upheld that search under 
"weapons search" case law. Id. at 983-85. Although resting on grounds other than 
"search incident to arrest," the facts underpinning Anderson and Strickling--a valid arrest 
or detention and the literal inability of the detainees to reach into their automobile-are 
consistent with the Belton case line relied upon by the State in this case. 
Belton was written to institute a straightforward rule governing search 
incident to arrest. Application of this rule, in turn, was intended to promote consistent 
results in motions to suppress evidence. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60. See also Pena, 
869 P.2d at 936 (appellate court has duty to "say what the law is and to ensure that it is 
uniform throughout the jurisdiction"); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1271 (Utah 
1993) (appellate review fosters consistent "courtroom to courtroom" results); accord 
Ornelas v. United States, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 1657,1662-63 (1996). The trial 
court's suppression order in this case, inconsistent with the Belton case line, gave rise to 
an inconsistent, legally unsupportable result. This Court should reverse the trial court's 
order of suppression, and the dismissal order that followed. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT 
GIRON'S AUTOMOBILE COULD NOT BE IMPOUNDED 
As explained in Point One, the trial court erroneously rejected the State's 
argument that Giron's automobile was properly searched incident to his arrest; on that 
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basis alone, this Court should reverse. However, the trial court also erroneously held 
"that as a result [of] the Defendant's vehicle being parked directly across [the street] from 
his residence, impoundment was neither authorized nor necessary" (R. 95). 
A. The Impoundment Was Proper under Police Department Policy. 
The trial court's holding was based upon its finding that "[t]here was no 
attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his passenger, or others at Mr. Giron's residence in the 
decisions of impound" (R. 96, finding 9(d)). That finding is correct. Again, however, it 
does not support the court's conclusion that impoundment was unnecessary. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that police officers legitimately 
have discretion to impound an arrestee's vehicle, "so long as discretion is exercised 
according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of 
criminal activity." Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987); State v. Aderholt, 545 
N.W.2d 559, 564 (Iowa 1996). That discretion is not related to the proximity of an 
arrestee's automobile to his or her residence. In this case, discretion to impound is guided 
by the following criteria in the Salt Lake Police impoundment policy: 
Officers of this department may impound vehicles as a means of 
enforcing local and state laws, removing a public hazard or nuisance, 
securing evidence, or protecting the vehicle and its contents until the 
owner can take possession of if [sic: it]. 
(Ref: Title 41, Chapter 6, UCA) 
To avoid needless expense and inconvenience to the vehicle owner, 
officers shall use discretion in determining whether or not a vehicle 
should be impounded. 
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(State's exh. 1, § 4-08-16.01 (parenthetical citation in original), copied in appendix II). 
Asked why he impounded Giron's automobile, Officer Bench explained: "Driver arrest, 
no driver license, nobody to turn the vehicle over to" (R. 132). That explanation was 
consistent with the above-quoted policy, permitting impoundment "as a means of 
enforcing local and state laws." The prosecutor also argued that Giron's lack of a driver's 
license justified impoundment (R. 188). Driving on suspension is a crime, Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-3-227 (Supp. 1995). Further, impoundment of a vehicle driven by an 
unlicensed driver is supported by State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272,444 P.2d 517, 519 
(1968) (vehicle also did not belong to the defendant). By impounding Giron's 
automobile, Officer Bench sought to prevent Giron from unlawfully driving it. 
Therefore, the impoundment was proper. 
B. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Require Inquiry into 
Alternative Disposition of an Arrestee's Automobile. 
To the extent that State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), suggests a 
different result, such suggestion is the product of dictum that conflicts with the United 
States Supreme Court's subsequent holding in Bertine (1987). In Hygh, the impoundment 
and inventory search of an arrestee's automobile were deemed improper for two reasons: 
first, the police did not give the arrestee any "opportunity to arrange for disposition of his 
own car"; second, the officers did not ask the arrestee "if anything of value was in the 
vehicle or tell [him] of the steps being taken to safeguard his property." 711 P.2d at 269. 
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The latter inquiry was required under the police department's written policy. See id. 
Thus the search was improper under the "policy compliance" standard of South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 378-81 (1976). Hygh, 711 P.2d at 270. 
However, the court in Hygh also intimated that police are constitutionally 
required to seek alternative disposition of an arrestee's vehicle before they may impound 
it; in other words, that police must show the "necessity" of impoundment. 711 P.2d at 
268. That intimation arose from the fact that under the police policy in question, the 
"alternative disposition" inquiry for the vehicle was optional: it stated that a vehicle "may 
be released at the scene" to another person. 711 P.2d at 268 (emphasis added). Only the 
"anything of value" inquiry, directed toward the vehicle's contents, was required under 
the policy. See id. at 269. However, by its discussion of the impounding officers' failure 
to undertake the "alternative vehicle disposition" inquiry, the court suggested that such 
inquiry is not optional, but is constitutionally required. 
Because the inventory search in Hygh was improper solely because of the 
officers' failure to obey the policy governing disposition of the vehicle's contents, the 
Hygh court's condemnation of the vehicle impoundment was dictum: that is, the same end 
result would have been reached had the question of impoundment not been discussed at 
all. More critically, that dictum has been repudiated by Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375-76, 
holding that as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, officers need not inquire into 
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alternative disposition of an arrestee's vehicle; there need only be some legitimate, 
noninvestigatory purpose for the impoundment. 
While courts in other jurisdictions have sometimes held that police must 
exhaust alternative dispositions for an arrestee's automobile, such decisions, like Hygh, 
generally predate Bertine. See, e.g., State v. McDaniel, 156 NJ. Super. 347,354-55,383 
A.2d 1174 (1978); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.3(c) at 520 n.55 (citing 
cases) (3rd ed. 1996). Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court, in light of Bertine, has repudiated 
its pre-Bertine cases holding that police must show "reasonable necessity" for 
impoundment. See Aderholt, 545 N.W.2d at 564. In this case, officers Bench and Ruth 
had a legitimate, police policy-supported reason to impound Giron's automobile-to stop 
him from driving without a valid driver's license.3 Therefore, under current Fourth 
Amendment law, stated in Bertine, the impoundment was proper. 
3In another prc-Bertine case, State v. Rice, 111 P.2d 695 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), the 
Utah Supreme Court ordered suppression in an inventory search case because the police officers 
in question had no written policy governing such searches, because the State conceded that 
officers lacked authority to impound the vehicle, and because '"the impoundment and search were 
admittedly a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive." 717 P.2d at 696-97. The 
absence of standard policy, by itself, invalidated the impoundment and search in Rice; the State's 
concession and the "pretext" conclusion (the latter based upon now-repudiated analysis) 
amounted to dictum. 
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POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONDEMNED 
THE INVENTORY SEARCH AS AN IMPROPER 
"PRETEXT' SEARCH 
Again, this Court should reverse for the reasons set forth in Point One of 
this brief. However, the trial court also erroneously ruled that the inventory search of 
Giron's automobile, following its impoundment, "was merely a pretext for an 
investigatory search for evidence" (R. 95), because "the search was conducted for an 
investigatory purpose" (R. 94). That ruling rests upon an unsupportable legal theory and 
upon clearly erroneous fact findings. 
A. "Pretext Inventory" Analysis is Legally Unsupportable. 
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected "pretext" analysis of both roadside 
detentions, State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), and of warrantless arrests, State v. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). In Whren v. United States, U.S. , 116 S. 
Ct. 1769 (1996), the United States Supreme Court followed suit with respect to roadside 
detentions, yet left open the possibility that automobile inventory searches, following 
impoundment, might be deemed unconstitutionally "pretextual." 116 S. Ct. at 1773, 
1774. That possibility was evidently left open because of dictum in Colorado v. Bertine, 
479 U.S. 367 (1987), and Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (both discussed in Whren, 
116S.Ct.atl773). 
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However, the possibility of a "pretext inventory analysis" is distinctly out of 
step with all of the Supreme Court's other Fourth Amendment law, canvassed in Whren, 
116 S. Ct. at 1774, holding that objective actions, rather than "ulterior motives," are at 
issue in determining whether police action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
For the same reasons set forth in Whren and in the Utah Supreme Court's Lopez decision, 
873 P.2d at 1135-38, there is no sound reason (under the federal or state constitution) to 
invalidate an automobile inventory search merely because the officer conducting the 
search harbored an "ulterior motive" to uncover evidence of a crime. 
Further, in Harmon, the Utah Supreme Court rejected "pretext" doctrine as 
applied to full custodial arrests, again explaining that officer "motivation" has no place in 
the question whether an arrest is valid. 910 P.2d at 1204-06. It would be incongruous to 
hold that an inventory search of an automobile, which is a far less dramatic intrusion on 
personal liberty than a custodial arrest, can be deemed unconstitutionally "pretextual" 
simply because the searching officer was motivated by the desire to find contraband. The 
trial court's ruling in this case is similarly incongruous, extending "pretext" doctrine to an 
automobile search, when no such protection extends to an arrest. 
In short, no "pretext inventory search" analysis should apply. To the 
contrary, sound law holds that so long as an inventory search is conducted in compliance 
with standardized policy, it is proper under the Fourth Amendment. See South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 378-81 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); State v. Strickling, 844 
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P.2d 979,987-89 (Utah App. 1992). Compliance with policy, not officer motivation, is 
the deciding factor. 
B. The Inventory Search Complied with Standard Procedure. 
In this case, the inventory search of Giron's automobile was begun by the 
arresting officer, Bench, and completed by Officer Russell, summoned by Officer Bench 
(R. 132,135, 168). The trial court found that the inventory search was not conducted in 
compliance with standard police procedure: 
9. The reported inventory search conducted when [sic: by] 
Officer Bench in this case was carried out in a manner contrary to 
established Salt Lake City Police Procedures for an inventory search 
in the following particulars: 
(a) Inventory forms were not used. 
(b) No written list of items found was made. 
(c) There was no attempt to contemporaneously record what 
was found where. 
(R. 94, copied in appendix III).4 
The foregoing findings are clearly erroneous. As demonstrated by State's 
exhibit 2 (copied in appendix II of this brief), Officer Russell did complete a standard 
impoundment and inventory form, documenting the items that he found in Giron's 
automobile. Officer Russell did complete that documentation contemporaneously to the 
actual search: he explained, at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, that he 
4Finding 9(d) states: "There was no attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his passenger, or others 
at Mr. Giron's residence in the decisions of impound" (R. 94). This finding is not relevant to the 
inventory search, although it is relevant to the question whether the officers properly impounded 
the automobile. Accordingly, finding 9(d) was addressed in Point Two (page 16) of this brief. 
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was required to complete the inventory form before turning the automobile over to the 
towing company (R. 172). 
And nothing in the Salt Lake Police impoundment policy (State's exh. 1, 
appendix II), prohibits the inventory duties from being divided between two officers, as 
happened in this case. Cf Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,368-69 (1987) (after 
defendant was taken into custody, but before tow truck arrived, backup officer conducted 
inventory of defendant's vehicle; search was held valid). Between them, Officers Bench 
and Russell conducted the inventory search in accord with the impoundment policy. 
Officer Bench searched the "front, back, and trunk" of the Giron's automobile before 
turning the task over to Officer Russell (R. 159-60). He found a blanket in the trunk, 
which he released to Giron's mother (R. 161). Bench told Officer Russell what he had 
found in the automobile, assisting Russell to properly complete the written inventory 
form(R. 161, 168). 
Although not stated in the written impoundment policy and form, Officer 
Russell explained that any contraband found in the automobile would be removed and 
delivered to a criminal investigator-in this case, Officer Bench (R. 171). Because Officer 
Bench had already removed contraband from the automobile when Officer Russell 
arrived, and because the inventory form only records items that were found and left in the 
automobile (R. 171), the contraband seized from Giron's automobile (like the blanket 
turned over to Giron's mother) was not listed on the inventory form. 
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In short, the inventory search was conducted in conformity with Salt Lake 
Police procedures. Accordingly, under Strickling and its underpinning authority, 844 
P.2d at 988-90, the inventory search was proper. Should it be necessary to address this 
point, the trial court's contrary judgment should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in Point One of this brief, this Court should REVERSE the trial 
court's ruling, and hold that the search of Giron's automobile was proper incident to his 
arrest. Alternatively, reversal is supported for the reasons explained in Points Two and 
Three. Contraband was lawfully seized from Giron's automobile, and therefore is 
admissible at his trial. The trial court's suppression order and its order of dismissal 
should be reversed, and this matter remanded to the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $%_ day of October, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Appellant was hand delivered to LINDA M. JONES of Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, attorney for defendant-appellee, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this 0% day of October, 1996. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ANGELO R. GIRON, 
Defendant. ] 
> MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF DEFENDANTS MOTION 
| TO SUPPRESS 
1 Case No. 951900702FS 
\ Judge Bohling 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Angelo R. Giron submits the following memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of his motion to suppress evidence seized during an unlawful 
search of his automobile. Salt Lake City Police Officer D. Bench ("Officer Bench") 
arrested Giron on January 22,1995 for failing to obey a police officer and failure to 
signal. After Giron was taken into custody, Officer Bench began to search Giron's 
automobfle to "inventory" the contents of the car so it could be impounded. Narcotics 
and drug paraphernalia were found in the car. 
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To justify this type of warrantless search, the state must show that the 
impoundment was lawful and that the inventory search was proper and not a mere 
pretext for an investigatory search. Under Utah law, the impoundment and search of 
Giron's car were illegal. Therefore, Giron asks this court to suppress the evidence found 
by Officer Bench. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 22,1995, Salt Lake City police Officer's Bench and Ruth observed 
Giron and passenger Zaragoza ("Zaragoza") driving Giron's automobile at approximately 
8:00 p.m. They saw Giron make a U-turn and pull to the curb. According to the 
officers, Giron did not signal his intentions to turn. 
The officers pulled behind Giron's car and activated the emergency lights on top 
of their unmarked police car. Officer Bench approached Giron on the driver's side and 
Officer Ruth approached Zaragoza. Zaragoza quickly exited the vehicle, allegedly 
discarded narcotics, and ran away from Officer Ruth. 
Officer Ruth caught up to Zaragoza and a struggle followed. When Officer 
Bench saw that Officer Ruth needed assistance he turned to Giron as he was running 
away and told Giron to stay in his vehicle and wait for his return. After Officer Bench 
left, Giron drove away. 
After the situation with Zaragoza had been resolved, the officers went to Giron's 
home at 600 West 375 North, Salt Lake City, Utah. They had obtained the address from 
Giron's identification. No one appeared to be home. 
After leaving Giron's residence, they saw Giron drive past them. The officers 
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followed Giron and initiated their lights and siren, Giron pulled to the curb at 
approximately 610 West 400 North, Salt Lake City, Utah. Officer Bench approached 
Giron and told him to exit the vehicle. Giron was immediately taken into custody. 
Officer Bench began a search of the vehicle. During the search, the officer 
located narcotics and drug paraphernalia. Officer Bench did not complete a department 
inventory form and stopped his search after locating the narcotics and paraphernalia. He 
used no formalized inventory procedure when searching. 
Giron's mother came out of their home which was located at 600 West, 375 
North, Salt Lake City, Utah. She complained that the officers were picking on Giron 
because of his drug problem. 
Officer Bench took the evidence seized from the vehicle and field tested the 
substance found. It tested positive for cocaine. Giron was taken to the Salt Lake 
County jail on charges of possession of a controlled substance, failure to obey the lawful 
order of a police officer, and failure to signal. 
Another officer on the scene, Officer Russell, filled out the impound form for 
Officer Bench. The car was impounded pending the forfeiture process. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EVIDENCE FOUND IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF GIROhPS 
CAR MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THERfe WAS NO BASIS 
FOR THE IMPOUNDMENT OF GIROhTS CAR. 
The narcotics evidence must be suppressed because the search that produced the 
evidence was unlawful. To justify a warrantless search, the state must first show that the 
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impound was lawful. State v. Hvgh. 711 P*2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985)(holding that 
inventory search of vehicle was not proper because it was pretextual and not conducted 
according to proper procedures). 
The Salt Lake Police Department has established regulations which establish when 
an officer may impound a vehicle. Officers may impound a vehicle to enforce state and 
local laws, to protect public safety, to secure evidence or to protect the car until the 
owner can take possession. Salt Lake City, UT., Police Department Guidelines § 4-08-
16.01. (1991). 
With regard to the first basis for impoundment, Utah state law provides a 
number of instances where the impound of a vehicle is part of the enforcement of a 
specific law. For example, vehicles may be impounded by a police department when the 
car is improperly registered or stolen, Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-115 (1953); if the 
automobile is used to transport controlled substances, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 
(1953); or if the vehicle is abandoned, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-116.10 (1953). There is 
no explicit statutory authority for a police officer to impound the vehicle of someone who 
has been arrested for a violation like failure to obey or failure to signal. 
It would also have been proper to impound Giron's car if it was necessary to 
secure evidence. This basis would apply if the officers had some reason to believe that 
the vehicle was involved in the commission of a crime. See, e.g.. State v. Young, 204 
S.E.2d 556 (1974)(police arresting a defendant for a brutal murder discover blood on his 
car and had reason to believe the car was involved in the crime). There is no indication 
from the facts in Giron's case that the police officer's impounded the car because there 
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was reason to believe it had been involved in a crime. 
The public safety rationale for impoundment would require that the car being left 
on the street would cause potential danger to the public. This could include a car that 
was parked on the side of the highway, e ^ United States v. t>riffmT 729 F.2d 475 (7th 
Or. 1984), or a vehicle that was inoperable and in the middle of the road, &&, People v. 
Clark. 32 111App.3d 898, 336 N.E.2d 892 (1975), affd, 65 H1.2d 169, 357 N£2d 798 
(1976). There is no indication that Giron's car would have posed any possible threat to 
public safety. He was parked on the legally on the side of the road in a residential 
neighborhood. 
The fourth basis for impoundment by Salt Lake City police officer's is to secure 
the defendant's property while they are under arrest. Generally, courts have held that if 
an arrested party is away from home, the police have the authority to impound their 
personal effects, including their automobile. Cabbler v. Superintendent 528 F.2d 1142 
(4th Cir. 1975). However, the requirement that the arrested party be "away from home" 
has been central to a number of cases that have rejected an impoundment when the 
defendant was arrested near their residence. See, e.g.. United States v. Squires. 456 F.2d 
967 (2d Cir. 1972)(it was unnecessary for police to impound vehicle parked behind 
residence of arrestee); State v. Simpson. 95 Wash.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980)(when 
defendant arrested at home, impoundment of truck parked in front pf his residence 
illegal). See generally 2 Wayne r. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment § 73(c), at 85-86 (2d ed. 1987). 
In Giron's case, there was no need to impound his vehicle to protect his property. 
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The automobile was parked at 610 West 400 North. His home is located at 600 West, 
375 North, Salt Lake City, Utah. Giron was so close to his own home that his mother 
could see the arrest take place from their home and came out to speak to the officers. 
There is no evidence that was obstructing traffic or was in any danger of being damaged. 
In sum, the impoundment of Giron's vehicle by the Salt Lake Police Department 
was improper. Under the Salt Lake Police Departments own Guidelines, there was no 
need to impound Giron's vehicle to enforce a state or local law, to protect public safety, 
to secure evidence, or to protect the defendant's property. Therefore, the search that 
Officer Bench undertook to "inventory" the car was improper and the fruits of that 
search should be suppressed as evidence in this case. 
II. THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE 
INVENTORY WAS MERELY A PRETEXT FOR AN 
INVESTIGATORY SEARCH. 
The evidence seized during the "inventory" search should be suppressed because 
the inventory was a mere pretext for an investigatory search. The United States Supreme 
Court established in South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364 (1976), that an 
warrantless search in the context of impounding of a vehicle was lawful. However, the 
inventory cannot be a mere "pretext concealing an investigatory police motive." 
Opperman. 428 U.S. at 382-83. (Powell, J., concurring). 
Subsequent Utah cases have fleshed out the perimeters of inventory searches. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established that inventory searches can only be upheld if 
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there is established reasonable procedure to do so, and that the search conforms to that 
procedure. Hvgh. 711 at 269. In Hvgh. a Salt Lake City police ofiBcer searched a vehicle 
after he had arrested the defendant for outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrants. Id. at 
266. The officer did not request the permission of the owner, did not completely search 
the vehicle and did not use a form to list the items in the automobile. Id. at 270. The 
Utah Supreme Court held that given the officer's conduct, the search could not be 
characterized as an inventory search. 
Similarly, in Giron's case, Officer Bench did not discuss the search with Giron, 
stopped his search once incriminating evidence was found and did not inventory any of 
the property himself. An inventoiy list was not filled out until another officer 
subsequently conducted a search of the car. Officer Bench's purpose appears to be 
investigatory and not to protect Giron's personal property while the car was impounded. 
In sum, the narcotics seized from Giron!s car should be suppressed in this case 
because the inventory search made by Officer Bench was a mere pretext for an 
investigatory search. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Giron urges this Court to suppress the evidence gathered during an 
unlawful search of his automobile on January 22,1995. The impoundment of Giron's car 
was improper as it was parked legally near his home. In addition, the inventory search of 
Giron's vehicle was unlawful as it was a pretext for an investigatory search. Article I, 
section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. The warrantless search 
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conducted by Officer Bench does not fit within any of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. Given the unconstitutionality of the search, the evidence that was found 
should be suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f l " davof (\(hks^ , 1995. 
JAMES (p. BRADSHAW 
I Attorney/for Defendant 
8 
0 0 0 01} Q 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of _ Oohkey^ . 1995,1 
mailed the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Richard G. Hamp 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State #S-3700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
)MJ^JU^ 
000061 
E.NEALGUNNARSON _
 p T 0 ~ f^ U* ^ 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County S^C-' <-w 
RICHARD HAMP, 4048 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ANGELORAYGIRON, 
SUPPLEMENT TO STATE'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CaseNo.951900702FS 
Defendant. Hon. William B. Bohling 
The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, E. Neal Gunnarson, Salt Lake District 
Attorney, Richard Hamp, Deputy District Attorney, hereby submits this Supplemental 
Memorandum. 
FACTS 
The officers had first encountered the Defendant and a passenger at approximately 8:00 
PM when Defendant made two traffic violations which Officer Bench observed. (Reporter's 
Transcript of Proceedings, Direct Examination of Officer Dale Bench, September 18, 1995, p. 5, 
11. 11-15.) Officer Bench made a standard traffic stop. However, when the officers approached 
Defendant's vehicle, the passenger leaped from the car and ran down the street, discarding a 
package as he fled. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 6,1. 25; p. 7,11. 1-9.) After Officer 
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Bench's partner, Officer Ruth, chased down the passenger, a physical altercation ensued between 
Ruth and the passenger. Then suddenly people came piling out of a nearby home apparently to 
rescue the passenger. At that point the situation became extremely tense. (Cross Examination of 
Officer Bench, p. 31, U. 21-23.) 
Officer Bench then ordered Defendant to stay at least once while he went to help his 
partner. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 7, 11. 13-25; p. 8, U. 1-14.) Nevertheless, 
Defendant sped off as soon as Officer Bench went to help Officer Ruth. (Direct Examination of 
Officer Bench, p. 8, U. 1-5.) 
After the officers settled the situation with Defendant's passenger, Mr. Zaragosa, they 
used Defendant's identification to locate his home. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 8,11. 
15-25; p. 9,11.1-4.) Meanwhile, they discovered that Defendant's license had expired. They went 
to Defendant's home only to discover that no one was there. Finally, at 12:30 AM the officer 
spotted Defendant and another passenger driving in the same car near Defendant's home. (Direct 
Examination of Officer Bench, p. 9, 11. 22-25; p. 10, U. 1-8.) Even though they initiated their 
emergency lights, Defendant continued to drive for another block before finally stopping. (Direct 
Examination of Officer Bench, p. 10, U. 9-16.) The officers approached Defendant's car and 
ordered him to get out of the vehicle. Defendant claimed the door was broken so the officers had 
him climb out of the window. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 11, U. 1-19.) Officer 
Bench immediately placed Defendant under arrest. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 11,11. 
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20-23.) Officer Bench testified that he decided to impound the vehicle from the time he pulled 
Defendant over. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 12, U. 1-8.) Officer Bench further 
testified that it is his standard practice when he arrests a driver to ask passengers whether they 
have a valid driver's license. (Cross Examination of Officer Bench, p. 36, U. 7-20.) 
ANALYSIS 
L DUAL BASES FOR REASONABLE AND PROPER 
JUSTIFICATION FOR IMPOUND SEARCH 
There are two bases under which an officer may impound a vehicle. First, an officer may 
impound a vehicle if the officer has express statutory authority. See State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 
979, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Second, an officer may impound a vehicle when circumstances 
surrounding the initial stop reasonably justify the search. State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 
1986). In the instant case, the officers did not have express statutory authority to impound the 
vehicle. However, considering the totality of the surrounding circumstances, it was reasonable for 
the officers to impound the vehicle. Furthermore, the impound was conducted pursuant to the 
Salt Lake City Police Department policy. 
Although the vehicle was not blocking traffic as in State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454 
(Utah 1987), the seizure was reasonable due to the lateness of the hour and the Defendant's 
behavior during the course of the evening. Salt Lake City Police Department policy does not 
require officers exhaust all other alternatives before impounding. "The reasonableness of any 
particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of 
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alternative 'less intrusive' means.*7 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374, 107 S.Ct. 738, 742, 
93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2610, 
77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983)). Rather, the policy gives officers authority to use alternatives to 
impounding based on officer discretion. Moreover, there comes a point when economy of scale 
for any particular law breaker necessitates stronger measures to insure officer and public safety. 
Defendant did not obey the lawful order of Officer Bench to remain where he was. Indeed, 
Defendant sped off. "Actually he squealed his tires as he left." (Direct Examination of Officer 
Bench, p. 8,11. 4-5.) Then when confronted once again, this time in the middle of the night, the 
Defendant did not immediately stop. Due to this evasive and combative behavior it was 
reasonable for the officers to immediately arrest Defendant, search his vehicle incident to his 
arrest and then impound the vehicle. Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, the 
impoundment of Defendant's vehicle was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
H. REASONABLE AND PROPER IMPOUND WAS 
NOT A PRETEXT FOR INVESTIGATORY SEARCH 
The impound search in the instant case was not a pretext for further investigative 
searching. The Utah Court of appeals stated in Slate v. Strickling: 
[The officer's] subjective motivation in wanting to search defendant's vehicle for 
evidence of burglary is essentially irrelevant. The determinative evidence here is 
what the officer actually did, without regard to his motives in a particular case, 
when confronted with registration violations. [The officer's] unrefuted testimony 
is that he impounded the great majority of vehicles he stopped with expired 
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registrations. Defendant made no showing that [the officer's] practice in this 
regard was at odds with what reasonable officers customarily do. 
844 P.2d 979, 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Similarly, in the instant case Officer Bench testified that he based the impound on "driver 
arrest, no driver license, nobody to turn the vehicle over to." (Direct Examination of Officer 
Bench, p. 12, 11. 5-6.) Further, he stated that this was consistent with Salt Lake City Police 
Department policy and that his actions were pursuant to his usual practices. (Direct Examination 
of Officer Bench, p. 12, 11. 7-9; p. 15, 11. 10-11.). Under the totality of the circumstances the 
actions of Officer Bench were reasonable. Therefore, the impound inventory of Defendant's 
property in his vehicle was not a pretext for further investigatory searching. Accordingly, the 
inventory was reasonable and did not violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
HI. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Even assuming, arguendo, that there was not sufficient basis upon which to impound the 
vehicle, the search was made incident to arrest and was therefore reasonable. See Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). "A contemporaneous, 
warrantless search of the area within an arrestee's immediate control is permissible for the 
purpose of recovering weapons the arrestee might reach, or to prevent concealment or destruction 
of evidence." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769,784 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The area of immediate 
control includes the interior portion of a vehicle even when the arrestee is outside the vehicle. 
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State, in re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461, 
101 S.Ct. 2860,2864,69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); see also State v. Kent, 665 P.2d 1317,1318 (Utah 
1983Xsearch of passenger area of car permissible where arrestee was handcuffed and lying on 
ground next to car).. 
In the instant case, the officer could reasonably justify the search on either prong. When 
the officers stopped Defendant the first time, the passenger leaped from the vehicle and ran down 
the street, discarding a package of drugs. Later after they found Defendant he did not 
immediately stop. It was reasonable for the officers to conclude that Defendant and/or his 
passenger may again attempt to conceal or destroy evidence of controlled substances. 
Additionally, the police contact with Defendant and his passenger had been violent, and 
Defendant had fled the scene of a traffic stop once. When the officers finally stopped Defendant 
the second time it was dark, late and they Defendant had demonstrated a willingness to take 
extreme measures from being stopped by the police. Therefore, it was reasonable for the officers 
to search Defendant, and the area of his immediate control, including the interior of the vehicle for 
weapons. Thus, Defendant was not subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure. Accordingly, 
the Court should deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
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DATED this 19th day of October, 1995. 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney 
^ / ^ 
RICHARD HAMP 
Deputy District Attorney 
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CERTIFIC ATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Supplement To State's 
Memorandum In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Suppress was delivered to James C. 
Bradshaw, Attorney for Defendant ANGELO RAY GIRON, at 10 West 300 South, Suite 500, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on the 23 day of October, 1995. 
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APPENDIX II 
Salt Lake City Police Impound Policy 
Inventory Form for Giron's Automobile 
4-08-16,00 IMPOUNDS 
4-08-16.01 Policy 
Officers of this department may impound vehicles as a meansTS^Wflflffllng 
local and state laws, removing a public hazard or nuisance, securing: 
evidence, or protecting the vehicle and its contents until the owner can 
take possession of if. 
(Ref.: Title 41, Chapter 6, UCA) 
To avoid needless expense and inconvenience to the vehicle owner, officers 
shall use discretion in determining whether or not a vehicle should be 
impounded. 
Chinpd 9/8S This department will provide the vehicle owner a NOTICE OF IMPOUNDMENT 
within 48 hours of impoundment. In the case of state impounds, the 
Division of Motor Vehicles must be notified within 48 hours of impound. 
The impounding officer must turn in the original copy of the STATE TAX 
form with the impound report. Records will forward the form to the Auto 
Theft Unit. Auto Theft personnel will notify the Motor Vehicle Division. 
(For disposition of parking citation, see § 4-06-02.04C) 
Added 8/90 When officers of this department impound a motor vehicle under city code, 
a NOTICE OF IMPOUNDMENT AND RIGHT TO IMPOUND HEARING form will be 
given to the owner of the vehicle. In the absence of the owner, the form 
will be left with the driver. This form should NOT be used with state tax 
impounds. 
Added 7/31 The officer will fill in the name of the vehicle owner or driver from the 
information obtained by valid identification. The most current address 
should be obtained. 
Added 7/9! The officer will date and sign the form and deliver the original to the 
vehicle owner or driver at the time of the impound. The copy of the 
NOTICE OF IMPOUNDMENT AND RIGHT TO IMPOUND HEARING form should be 
turned in with the initial report to Records Bureau who will forward it 
with the case to Auto Theft. 
Added 7/9! The initial officer should deliver the original copy of the form to the 
vehicle's registered owner or driver during the course of the investigation 
(such as at the hospital or the jail). 
Added 7/91 If the vehicle's owner or driver has left the sc^ne prior to the impound, 
the original copy should be left in a visible and "safe place in the vehicle's 
driver compartment. The officer should write "Unavailable to Sign" in the 
"Deliver To" area. The copy should then be forwarded as above. 
4-08-16.02 Authority of Parking Enforcement Personnel 
Changed 7/S1 Parking enforcement personnel are authorized to impound vehicles that are 
parked in violation of city ordinances and state laws. Upon request, an 
officer of this department will respond and provide assistance as needed. 
Such impounds will be coordinated through the police dispatcher and 
appropriate reports and documentation will be maintained by this 
department. 
Added 7/91 D u r i n g a c i t y i m p o u n d , t h e s a m e NOTICE OF IMPOUNDMENT AND NOTICE OF 
RIGHT TO IMPOUND HEARING form will b e u s e d b y p a r k i n g e n f o r c e m e n t 
Dersonnel in the same manner as prescribed above for police personnel. 
Only those towing companies specified by contractual agreement with the 
city will be used to tow impounded vehicles. 
JPwgeo 9/84 There are several impound lots used to store impounded vehicles. The 
reporting officer must determine the destination of the impounded vehicle 
and put the address of the impound lot in the VEHICLE FIELD on the 
impound report. 
4-08-16.04 Holds and Vehicle Inventory 
A. Holds on Impounded Vehicles 
At the time of impound, .the officer must notify the dispatcher of any 
holds on the impounded vehicle. Records personnel will refer to this 
information when a vehicle owner or the owner's representative 
inquires about release of the vehicle. 
1. Hold for owner - The vehicle may be released to the owner or 
the owner's representative. 
2. Hold for State - Release of the vehicle must be obtained 
through the State Division of Motor Vehicles. 
Chrgec 1/ii 3. Hold for Recovered Stolen - Release of the vehicle must be 
obtained through the Auto Theft Unit. 
4. Hold for evidence - The vehicle can only be released upon 
authorization of the investigating division or the County 
Attorney's Office. 
C^ ged 5/89 If a car is impounded as a recovered stolen vehicle, the car shall be 
removed to the CITY IMPOUND LOT and "HELD FOR OWNER". Should 
the vehicle be improperly registered, evidence in another case, 
ownership in dispute, etc., a hold should be placed for the follow-up 
unit. (Any vehicle which would have been released to the owner at 
the scene can be f,HELD FOR OWNER", when impounded.) 
(See § 4-08-03.03) 
Chrged 5/89 When a vehicle is impounded with a hold for evidence, the hold will 
expire seven days from the date of impoundment. If circumstances 
require the hold to be extended past the sev^n-day period, follow-u^ 
investigators must submit a written requesj through their division 
commander advising the impound coordinator of the extension. The 
extended hold will be removed by the follow-up officer as soon as 
possible. 
B. Vehicle Inventory 
A thorough inventory search will be made of all vehicles being 
impounded (ref. § 4-04-03.05). A thorough inventory search will 
include: 
Accsd 9/88 1* The interior of the vehicle, including under the seats, the glovs 
box, etc. 
2. Under the hood 
Sepnnttd 7/'8/91 
3. The trunk, when possible 
Added 6/89 4. All closed containers, including sacks, bags, boxes, etc. 
The officer will remove all valuables from the vehicle and place them 
in evidence for safekeeping. 
Changed 6/89 Closed or locked briefcases, luggage, etc., will be opened before 
being placed in evidence. Such items will be opened in the presence 
of a supervisor if the locks must be forced or other damage done in 
order to open them. It is recommended the vehicle's owner or driver 
be present. 
All items not considered valuables, such as spare tires, old clothing, 
etc., will be locked in the vehicle's trunk, if possible. 
The officer will include in the initial report: 
1. Valuables placed into evidence 
2. Valuable items left in the vehicle because of the difficulty of 
transporting them to evidence (large machinery, etc.) will be 
listed in the report's details. 
3. If no valuables are found in the vehicle, the officer will note 
that information in the report's details. 
4-08-16.05 Releasing Vehicles to Incompetent Drivers 
Chained 6/89 The city assumes control of, and responsibility for, vehicles once they are 
impounded. In order to comply with the department's obligations under 
the law and to avoid liability for any damage or injury resulting from the 
release of an impounded vehicle to an intoxicated or otherwise 
incapacitated person, the vehicle owner's condition must be assessed 
before the vehicle is released. 
(Ref.: 12.24.060 SLC Code) 
If a vehicle owner requests release of an impounded vehicle and appears 
to be intoxicated or otherwise incapable of operating the vehicle safely, 
records personnel will request that an officer be dispatched to the desk. 
The assigned officer will evaluate the owner's condition and take 
appropriate action. 
If the owner proves to be intoxicated or unable to operate a vehicle 
safely, the vehicle will not be released. If the owner is incapacitated, but 
requests that the vehicle be released to another person, and the officer 
is satisfied that the person could legally operate the vehicle, the officer 
may authorize release of the vehicle. 
4-08-16.06 Access to the City Impound Lot 
This policy serves to limit access to impounded vehicles in storage at the 
city impound lot in order to establish accountability for property removed 
from impounded vehicles. No one, including police officers, will be allowed 
access to the impound lot without complying with procedures outlined in 
this order. 
Added 1/86 Impound lots under state control are not governed by this policy. 
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Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
JAMES C BRADSHAW, Esq., No. 3768 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-2114 
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Third Judiciai District 
JAN 2 6 1996 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ANGELO R. GIRON, 
Defendant 
i AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
> and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Case No. 951900702FS 
> Judge Bohling 
The above-entitled manner came on for hearing on the 30th day of October, 1995. 
The State was present and represented by its counsel, Richard Ramp and Fred 
Burmester. The Defendant was present and represented by his counsel James C. 
Bradshaw. The Court having received the States Memorandum and Supplemental 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and having received 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, and having heard the 
testimony presented at the hearing of September 18,1995, and further having heard the 
arguments of counsel on October 30,1995, and being otherwise advised in the matter 
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issues of the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on January 22,1995, Salt Lake City Police Officer, D. Bench, stopped the 
vehicle of Defendant Angelo Giron, based on Mr. Giron's commission of traffic 
violations and other criminal offenses committed in the officers presence. 
2. Mr. Giron's vehicle at the time of his detention and arrest was lawfully parked 
directly across from hi? residence. 
3. After stopping the vehicle, Officer Bench immediately placed Mr. Giron under 
arrest, handcuffed Mr. Giron, and placed Mr. Giron into Officer Bench's vehicle. 
4. After placing Mr. Giron under arrest and placing Mr. Giron in his vehicle, 
Officer Bench requested and obtained registration information relevant to Mr. Giron!s 
vehicle which indicated that the vehicle was lawfully registered and licensed. 
5. Subsequent to obtaining the registration information, Officer Bench initiated a 
search of Defendant's car which revealed controlled substances. 
6. No controlled substances were in plain view of the officer. 
7. That at the time he conducted a search of Mr. Giron's vehicle, Officer Bench 
expressly justified the search as an inventory, which he stated was necessary as a result of 
a need to impound Mr. Giron's vehicle. 
8. That Officer Bench never asked the Defendant if his passenger could accept 
custody of the vehicle, if there was someone in his home that could accept custody of the 
2 
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vehicle, and never inquired of Mr. Giron's passenger if he'd be willing to take custody of 
the vehicle. 
9. The reported inventory search conducted when Officer Bench in this case was 
carried out in a manner contrary to established Salt Lake City Police Procedures for an 
inventory search in the following particulars: 
(a) Inventory forms were not used. 
(b) No written list of items found was made. 
(c) There was no attempt to contemporaneously record what was found 
where. 
(d) There was no attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his passenger, or others at 
Mr. Giron's residence in the decisions of impound. 
10. Although Officer Bench articulated that his purpose in searching Mr. Gironfs 
car was to inventoiy the items in the vehicle, his actions in searching the vehicle, his 
testimony, and his demeanor upon the witness stand indicate that the search was 
conducted for an investigatory police purpose. 
11. At the time Officer Bench searched Mr. Giron's car, aoy possibility of Mr. 
Giron gaining access to the car for purposes of recovering a weapon, or concealing or 
destroying evidence had been completely eliminated by the arrest, handcuffing, and the 
removal of the Defendant from the area of the vehicle. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court issues the following: 
3 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That as a result the Defendant's vehicle being parked directly across from his 
residence, impoundment was neither authorized nor necessary. 
2. Even assuming arguendo the impound was justified, the "inventory" search was 
merely a pretext for an investigatory search for evidence. 
3. That at the time of the search the Defendant had been secured and removed 
from the area, that there was no physical or temporal proximity to the arrest, and no 
basis to justify the search of Defendant's vehicle as a search incident to his arrest. 
4. The search of Defendant's vehicle cannot be justified under any exceptions to 
the warrant requirements of the Utah State and United States Constitution. Therefore, 
evidence discovered in the Defendant's vehicle must be suppressed as violative of 
Defendant's right to be free from illegal searches and seizures as guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment by the United States Constitution, and by our Article 1, Section 14 
of the Utah State Constitution. 
DATED this day of January, 1996. 
c Ji ; j^ih 
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLlftG 
Third District Court Jtidge J 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the fu^ day of January, 1996,1 mailed the 
foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid, 
to: 
Richard G. Hamp 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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